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| 02/11/2001 11:46 AM by Rodrigo; ESS |
Fred, every steady state of a replicator dynamics is Nash and vice-versa. When we ask whether the stability of a steady state leads to a refinement of Nash, then every ESS is an asymptotically stable steady state, though the converse is not true. The problem you solved might be one with a solutuon that is ESS. I recommend the following books: (1) FUDENBERG & LEVINE: The Theory of Learning in Games, MIT Press, 1998, chapter 3. A less technical book is: (2) BINMORE: Fun and Games, D.C. Heath and Company, 1992, pages 422-429. The original paper on ESS is: (3) Maynard Smith & Price (1973): "The logic of animal conflict", Nature 246: 15-18. Other surveys are: (4) HOFFBAUER & SIGMUND: TheTheory of Evolution and Dynamical Systems, Cambridge University Press, 1988. (5) WEIBULL: Evolutionary Game Theory, MIT Press, 1995. [Manage messages]
I have been working on lattice based models of evolutionary games. The learning rules are always switch-if-better (still an undergrad so anything else heap big complicated) when I run simple coordination games with the coordination [View full text and thread]
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