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Respond to the question: incentive calculation issues?

12/15/2019 06:43 AM by roterdam; incentive calculation issues
Very gratifying to have found this community.
I am in a problem, which relies on game theory, for its solution.
It is as follows:
Alice wants to buy a TV from Bob for a price of $ 300.
Neither party trusts each other so they trust a third party that will serve as an escrow, and will only send the amounts of money that both agree.
Then Bob could pick up the TV and go on a date with Alice to hand it over.
But it could happen that when Bob goes to the meeting place, this place is an ambush, and Alice steals the TV from Bob, then it seems reasonable that if Bob is going to take a risk, Alice should deposit an amount in the escrow, to compensate the risk that Bob runs, we could say for example $ 300.
But now another problem arises, if Alice deposits $ 300 (and since the escrow will only send funds when they both agree), Bob could choose not to go to the appointment, and blackmail Alice so that she accepts to release part of the escrow.
Assuming something is better, nothing Alice could be forced to accept blackmail, to recover at least $ 100 of the $ 300 she deposited.
So it is reasonable to think that since Alice is also taking an initial risk, Bob should also deposit some amount in that initial deposit that will give him incentives to act correctly.
As a test say that Alice deposits $ 300 and Bob 150.
So let's say we would be in a similar situation, but that something has already improved, although even Bob could blackmail Alice from the $ 150 difference.
We could also match the amounts to $ 300 + $ 300 so we return to the starting point, because Alice could steal Bob from the TV and still demand some of the money that is deposited in the escrow.
My question is whether this problem could be raised through a game strategy that minimizes the risks, and maximizes the incentives so that both parties can act correctly, since if they take the wrong path, they would lose more than they would win.
Thank you very much. [Manage messages]